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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
KEITH L. KNIGHT, d.b.a. Knight Realty ~ 
Company, Plaintiff and Appellant, f 
vs. \ No. 8623 
ROSS H. CHAMBERLAIN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a ruling of the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, sustaining the 
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, made at the 
close of the plaintiff's evidence. The motion to dismiss was 
"for reasons indicated in the answer. Our Code, Section 25-5-4, 
subdivision 5, provides as follows: * * * 'In the following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement 
or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing, subscribed 
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by the party to be charged therewith: every agreement author-
izing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real 
estate for compensation.' " 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Most of the transcript of testimony is devoted to the 
testimony of the plaintiff himself. Mr. Knight testified that 
he is a realtor "engaged in the pursuit of buying, selling, leas-
ing and optioning for others" and has been engaged in that 
business for 15 years, and a licensed broker for 12 years (Tr. 
11 and 12). He had specialized in the matter of land develop-
ment and subdividing (Tr. 12). He met the defendant through 
a business associate and proceeded that very day to take an 
airplane ride over and around Salt Lake County to inspect 
various prospective areas for subdivision development on a 
large scale (Tr. 13). The defendant specified that he must 
have a minimum of 500 acres to be optioned and preferably 
1000 acres (Tr. 14). The defendant "wanted to know about 
water, and sewage, and as I recall, the matter of arterial high-
ways, his relative position to areas of employment, the con-
venience of getting to it, the school district arrangement, all 
of those miscellaneous and salient details beyond the point 
of location." (Tr. 16). After the airplane trip the defendant 
showed the plaintiff his method of operation, including his 
control sheets and financing schedules (Tr. 17). 
After an explanation that he felt he could bring this type 
of operation to Salt Lake City and be successful with it, he 
said, "Keith, I'll be glad to pay you for your services in at-
tempting to package up * * * " (interrupted by objection). 
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"Well, Mr. Chamberlain said that he was desirous of my going 
ahead and lining up some options." (Tr. 18}. "Mr. Chamber-
lain stated to me, he said, 'Keith, as we progress on this pro-
gram', or words to this effect, 'I will be glad to pay you for 
your services.' It was upon the strength and integrity of that 
statement-(interrupted by objection" (Tr. 19}. 
A further trip by motor car was taken the next day to in-
spect the various areas seen from the air during which "I felt 
enthused about the possibilities of packaging up the type of 
acreage that Mr. Chamberlain wanted because he showed 
~! very definite interest in these areas. I told him it was custo-
mary on the part of realtors that in the event we could get 
our options exercised, that we would look to the sellers for 
the payment of our commissions. I told Mr. Chamberlain that 
he would have no obligation for payment of my services, if 
I could exercise the option.'' And Mr. Chamberlain promised 
to send to the plaintiff the form of option he would like to 
use (Hr. 22). 
The type of option m use by the defendant involved 
''around $25.00 down and $25.00 per acre year year rental 
value" (Tr. 24). There was never any money made available 
by the defendant for deposits on options (Tr. 25). 
Between August 26, 1955,and November 14, 1955, when 
the plaintiff saw the defendant for the second time, the plaintiff 
obtained the maps and identified the areas he would be working 
on (Tr. 20). He also went to the Chamber of Commerce and 
assembled the data that was required, including pamphlets, 
trade data and other pertinent details (Tr. 30}. The option 
form used by the defendant come about August 31st and is 
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marked Exhibit 2 (Tr. 30). The plaintiff then got ownership 
plats and proceeded to make personal contacts to determine 
whether the various owners would sell under option and 
discuss the form of the option with the various owners (Tr. 
32). He made no offers supported by consideration. "That 
was part of the difficulty of the program" and his effort was 
to obtain signatures of the owners, to be submitted to Mr. 
Chamberlain when he should next come to town, and actually 
paid no money, not even the $1.00 nominal consideration re-
cited (Tr. 33). He was unable to get anyone interested in 
signing the defendant's option form and had no authority 
to modify it (Tr. 34). 
A group of owners was represented by Mr. Elias Day, 
an attorney, who told the plaintiff that "this option will never 
work. We will have to talk a more positive arrangement on 
the purchase of the contract." To which plaintiff replied that 
he woud like Mr. Day to get "the best type of deal and send 
it back so I can submit it to my client" (Tr. 36). 
Mr. Chamberlain came to Salt Lake again on November 
14th (Tr. 43) and the parties spent considerable time together 
during that visit, including inspection of all of the areas 
where the plaintiff had been working (Tr. 45-46). 
The plaintiff informed the defendant that the activity 
of the Boeing people had had a tremendous impact on inter-
pretation of values in the county and was making plaintiff's 
task more difficult, and told the defendant that it would take 
$150,000.00 and $25,000.00 a year to handle a 1000 acre 
tract (Tr. 47). And with reference to another parcel of 1000 
acres the defendant said: "By all means we should definitely 
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option that." And as the defendant was about to leave, he said, 
"Knight, you go back over those areas. You bring me down 
some signed options, or earnest money receipts. I will spend 
$15,000.00 cash and $25,000.00 a year with you. And then you 
bring them to Sacramento with you and I want you to come 
down and look over our type of operations, so you can get a 
feel of how we will go into Salt Lake and as rapidly as you 
can put that together, you let me know and you fly down 
and bring them with you." But no cash was made available 
for option money (Tr. 48) and there was no discussion as 
to the form upon which the plaintiff would endeavor to obtain 
options ( T r. 49) . 
Thereupon the plaintiff proceeded "to accumulate that 
area" in the Dimple Dell vicinity, near Draper, Utah, and 
attempted to use the Intermountain Development Co. as the 
source of a master option, which would be supported by sub-
options in favor of the Intermountain Development Co. (Tr. 
72) on the assumption that $150,000.00 down would be 
available. In another area he was unable to get an option or 
any other oral indication within the terms of Mr. Chamber-
lain's statement "they would sell but they wanted a cash 
consideration" (Tr. 75). He attempted to obtain a commit-
ment from the Winn family, which wanted $2,000 per acre 
"they weren't willing to enter into an option agreement whose 
performance was subject to the potential buyer's performance. 
They wanted a firm contract." 
On November 29th, plaintiff went to Sacramento to contact 
the defendant and took with him such options as he had been 
able to obtain, such as Exhibit 7 (Tr. 77-78). By that time 
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it appeared that the Boeing option was not being exercised 
and this was discussed in passing ( T r. 78-79) . The plaintiff 
exhibited the documents he had obtaioed with the signatures 
and after a conference out of the office the defendant returned, 
threw them on the desk and said they weren't acceptable 
(Tr. 82). 
Prior to leaving, on November 29, the plaintiff said to the 
defendant: "Are you through with my services?" and the 
defendant replied: "Why don't you go back home and see 
what you can do about the Boeing program and see how you 
can line up 1000 acres on that portion of the tract that Boeing 
did not exercise" (Tr. 83). 
The options referred to $10.00 consideration but nothing 
was paid (Tr. 87). If the options contained in Exhibit 7 had 
been exercised, the defendant would not have been required 
to pay the plaintiff any compensation, as he would have been 
paid by the sellers (Tr. 85). These commissions would have 
been based on written agreements (Tr. 85). 
It was the plaintiff's understanding that he was to be paid 
for his services whether or not he was successful in completing 
the defendant's program (Tr. 134 and Tr. 138, 139). 
Mr. F. Orrin Woodbury testified in behalf of the plaintiff 
that he was experienced in commercial and industrial develop-
ments in Salt Lake City (Tr. 54), that he had a great deal of 
respect for the plaintiff in both his aggressiveness and ability 
to get a job done and intuition about doing the job or finding 
the job to do (Tr. 55). It is customary in Salt Lake City and 
under the Salt Lake Real Estate Board to obtain options for 
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would-be purchasers and to obtain commission based on the 
price paid if the options are taken up, and upon agreed com-
pensation if they aren't taken up (Tr. 56). Rule XVI (a) 
and (b) of Exhibit 5 indicate the expression of the Salt Lake 
Real Estate Board on this matter. Unless a prospective pur-
chaser deposits funds with which to pay for options, he refuses 
to work for such purchaser (Tr. 63). 
The defendant called Joseph Lacey as his witness, out 
of order, which testimony was not transcribed in view of the 
granting of the motion at the close of plaintiff's evidence 
(Tr. 111). 
Exhibit 2 was sent to the plaintiff by the defendant as 
being the type of option agreement the defendant wanted to 
use in Utah (Tr. 24, 25, 30). It is entitled an "option agree-
ment" and calls for a down payment of $25.00 per acre, and 
permits keeping the option alive for five years by paying an 
additional $25.00 per acre each year. 
Exhibit 3 contains some of the correspondence between 
the parties. The letter dated September 2, 195 5 includes this 
paragraph: 
"This is to advise that I am in the process of running 
down the owners of the parcels you indicated a greater 
interest in. As of this writing, I have not been as suc-
cessful as I might have been, but feel, within the next 
week or ten days, I'll be able to give you something 
specific to pass upon." 
A letter of September 26, 195 5, from the defendant to 
the plaintiff includes this paragraph: 
"In the meantime I think that we would be willing 
to enter into an option agreement on any of the prop-
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erties you describe in your letter. If you are able to 
get any of them put together, do so, and if Mr. Mc-
Cullough concurs, we will execute them when we are 
in Salt Lake City." 
The letter of October 12, 1955, from the plaintiff to the 
defendant includes the following: 
"Not having heard from you since your letter of 
September 26th that indiicated you would be willing 
to enter into some of the options on the land that I have 
tentatively committed, and in which letter you suggested 
you might come into Salt Lake, meeting Mr. McCul-
lough here, this is to advise that I have been awaiting 
your arrival to go over the numbers of parcels of lands 
that have been assembled for your consideration. * * * 
All of our parcels are definitely available, however, 
on that approach if we can commit the cash purchase of 
the first 40 acres in each instance. * * * I feel that I 
probably have rendered about as much of a service as 
I can contemplate at the present moment, until such 
time as I hear from you, preferably your dropping 
into Salt Lake at your convenience." 
Exhibit 6 is a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant and 
concludes with this sentence: 
"I am eager to complete my services to you to the 
best of my ability.'' 
Exhibit 7 is entitled a "Contract and Option", but an 
examination of it indicates that it is not an option, but a con-
tract of sale, reciting consideration of $10.00 and calling for 
definite commitments of both parties to the purchase and sale 
through periodic installments. These documents were signed 
only by the seller and were taken by the plaintiff to the defend-
ant in Sacramento, where the defendant stated: "these aren't 
acceptable" (Tr. 82). 
10 
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Exhibit 8 consists of further correspondence between the 
parties and includes a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant 
dated December 9, 195 5, which includes the two following 
paragraphs: 
"This is to advise you that I am very appreciative 
for your check in the amount of $90.50. I have taken 
the liberty of depositing hte check, even though this 
amount was in excess $13.61 of my actual cost of the 
round-trip air plane ticket to Sacramento. However, I 
am crediting this difference to Mr. Chamberlain's ac-
count with me for other expenses and services rendered 
in his employment of my services here in Salt Lake 
Valley. 
I have hesitated billing Mr. Chamberlain, in light 
of the fact that in the event we are able to transact 
any business with him on which I would be paid a sell-
ing commission, that would automatically pay for my 
services by virtue of the commissions that would be 
involved in any transactions consummated with him." 
The trial court made its ruling, granting the motion to 
dismiss, on the ground that Knight had been employed to 
obtain options for the purchase of real estate and that these 
must be in writing, as held by the California court (in Pacific 
South West Development Corp. vs. Western Pacific Railroad 
Co., 321 Pac. 2d 825) (Tr. 152). The court apparently relied 
also in part on the concurring opinion of Justice Wade in 
Andersen vs. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 Pac. 2d 725, wherein 
Justice Wade is supposed to reason that anyone who assists or 
contributes to dealing in or the purchase or sale of real estate, 
must have a broker's license and, likewise, must see that the 
record of his emplayment is in writing (Tr. 150). 
11 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Whether this decision is sound, rna y be considered and 
tested from consideration of three propositions: 
1. Employment of services to be paid for in the event there 
is no sale need not be in writing. 
2. Employment of a broker to obtain offers to sell real 
estate is not within the statute of frauds. 
3. Employment to obtain opinions to buy lands is not 
within the statute of frauds. (This appears to be the question 
as the trial court saw the case.) 
ARGUMENT 
1. Employment of services to be paid for in the event there 
iJ no sale need not be in writing. 
The employment contract here was m the alternative, 
depending on whether a sale was consummated. Mr. Knight 
testified that Mr. Chamberlain engaged his services to attempt 
to package lands in Salt Lake Valley and said he would be 
glad to pay for his services as they progressed on the program 
(Tr. 18, 19). On the next day plaintiff advised the defendant 
that if the options could be exercised and a transaction con-
summated, the plaintiff would look to the sellers of the land 
for his commissions and would not hold the defendant in 
that event (Tr. 22). And this agreement was plainly stated 
in the letter of December 9, 1955, contained in Exhibit 8. 
It may, therefore, be fairly said that the agreement between 
the parties was that the defendant would employ the plaintiff 
12 
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to work on the assembling of tracts of land in Salt Lake County, 
and would pay for his services in so doing, but it was agreed 
by the plaintiff, that in the event any lands were purchased 
by the defendant, the plaintiff's commission would be derived 
from the sellers of the land and not from the defendant. This 
then is not an agreement for compensation for the purchase 
or sale of real estate, but an agreement that no compensation 
need be paid by the defendant in the event there is a purchase 
or sale of real estate. The latter contingency was covered by 
written agreements with the owners of lands (Tr. 85) as the 
statute of frauds contemplates. 
The appellant concedes that an action in quantum meruit 
is not available to a broker who is employed to purchase or 
sell real estate, where he fails to put the agreement in writing, 
as in Baugh vs. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 355. Appellant 
has no quarrel whatever with that decision. 
But where the employment is to render services connected 
with land and not for the purchase or sale of land, a recovery 
for the reasonable value of services can be had, even though 
there is no memorandum in writing. 
In Andersen vs. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d 725, 
729, the plaintiff brought an action against a real estate broker 
pursuant to an oral agreement that the plaintiff could have 
one-third of the defendant's commissions on properties listed 
by the defendant with the help of the plaintiff. The court dis-
posed of the defendant's claim that the statute of frauds barred 
recovery by holding: "the contention of respondent that plain-
tiff cannot recover because his agreement was oral, is untenable. 
The contract was one of employment and not involving any 
13 
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right or interest in land. See Johnson vs. Allan, Utah 1945, 
158 P. 2d 134. The proposition that a contract for fee or com-
mission may be recovered by agent from broker, though not in 
wrting, is upheld in Arbuckle vs. Clifford F. Reed, 118 Cal. 
App. 272, 4 P. 2d 978, (and other cases)." 
A case of value on this point is Clark vs. Opp, 156 Ore. 
197, 66 P. 2d 1179. At page 1180 the court thus stated the 
question: 
"The propriety of the court's instructions upon the 
subjects of agency and ratification is also challenged. 
In paragraph IV of his complaint, plaintiff alleges: 
"That on or about the 1st day of May, 1931, it was 
agreed by and between the plaintiff and the defendants 
that if the plaintiff would go upon said mining prop-
erty, tunnel, timber and develop the said property and 
expose and sample the ore bodies thereon so that the 
same could be advantageously exhibited to one John 
M. Price, a prospective lessee, and would show said 
property to said prospective lessee, the defendants 
would pay unto the plaintiff ten per cent of any and 
all royalties which they might receive from any lease 
of asid premises made by the defendants with said 
John M. Price, until the sum of $10,000.00 had been 
paid plaintiff." 
The court easily disposed of this question under the Statute 
of Frauds as follows: 
"The distinction between a contract for the services 
of a real estate broker or agent and the contract alleged 
in plaintiff's complaint, as herein above set out, is 
recognized in the following cases: Bates v. Oregon-
American Lumber Company (D. C.) 285 F. 666; Hall 
v. Rankin, 22 Ariz. 13, 193 P. 756; Wilson v. Morton, 
85 Cal. 598, 24 P. 784; Sherman v. Clear View Or-
chard Co., 74 Or. 240, 145 P. 264." 
14 
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Another such case is Hall v. Rankin, 22 Ariz. 13, 193 P. 
756 and 757. There the oral agreement was as follows: 
'I have been trying to sell the Henrietta mine to the 
Big Ledge people, but the mine must stand the inspec-
tion of Mr. Shockey, their engineer. I have had a 
'racket' with him and I canont get them to go out and 
look over the property. You know these people, and 
I want you to get their engineer on the ground, and 
if I get $150,000 for it I will pay you $25,000 for your 
services, and if I sell it for less I will pay you very 
liberally, and in any event I will pay you for your trouble 
and expense." 
The court thus reasoned this portion of that case: 
"We construe the contract as one of employment or 
agency rather than one to "sell real estate, mines or 
other property, for compensation or commission", 
Statute of Frauds, paragraph 3272, subdiv. 7, Rev. Stat. 
Ariz. 1913, as amended by chapter 135, Session Laws 
Ariz. 1919. We would not be justified in straining the 
terms of the contract so as to bring it within the statute 
of frauds and thus do a great injustice to the plaintiff. 
It is a familiar canon of construction to construe a 
contract, if it may consistently be done, to be effective, 
rtaher than ineffective. 'Where a * * * contract as a 
whole is susceptible of two meanings, one of which 
will uphold the contract or render it valid and the 
other of which will destroy it or render it invalid, the 
former will be adopted so as to uphold the contract.' 
13 C.J. 539; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 6 Sup. 
Ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940. The statute of frauds, of course, 
is binding upon us and must be obeyed and enforced 
whenever a case falls within its provisions, but it was 
remarked by Chief Justice Buchanan in delivering the 
opinion in Lamborn v. Watson, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 
255, 14 Am. Dec. 275, where the defense under the 
statute was successfully relied on, for the protection 
t;) 
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of a dishonest defendant, that the statute "probably 
generates as many frauds as it prevents." The sub-
division of the statute referred to was clearly designed 
to protect owners of real estate against unfounded 
claims of brokers (Gorham v. Heiman, 90 Cal. 346, 27 
Pac. 289) and contemplates a transaction between 
parties contracting with each other as principals." 
This case also involves the interesting point that the com-
mission being sued for was not commission or compensation 
within the statute, but the reasonable value of services. The 
court held: "the suit is not one to recover 'compensation' or 
'commission' for the sale of real estate, but to recover the 
reasonable value of the services of the plaintiff as the agent 
of the defendant.'' The Arizona statute apparently related to 
either "compensation" or "commission." 
The Utah Statute of Frauds relates only to employment 
of agents "for compensation." In line with the Arizona case 
this word could reasonably be limited to a fixed percentage 
of a sale price and not applicable at all to an action for reason-
able value of services. 
In Kramer vs. Schmidt, 62 Mont. 568, 206 P. 620 and 
621, there was an oral agreement between the plaintiff and 
defendant relating to transfer or assignment of an option to 
buy land at a specified price. With reference to option, the 
case will be later considered, but on the question of com-
pensation for services, as distinguished from a commission, 
the Montana court said: 
"The agreement between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant did not amount to an employment of the for-
mer as a broker or agent to buy land or an interest in 
alnd, which by the statute is required to be in writing, 
lG 
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but to an engagement by him to perform a service 
which could be lawfully made by oral contract." 
Under the evidence in this case, it is obvious that if the 
appellant had been asked by an owner of land whether he was 
authorized to purchase or sell real estate in behalf of the 
respondent, Mr. Knight could have replied only that he was 
engaged to attempt to package parcels of land so that the 
respondent could consider the advisability of a purchase. The 
appellant's testimony and the written documents speak plainly 
of the employment of his services and not of his authority to 
purchase for the respondent and hold him for a commission. 
2. Employment of a broker to obtain offers to sell real 
estate is not within the statute of frauds. 
As this point is stated, it can hardly be questioned that it 
is not within the statute of frauds. In Woolley vs. Wycoff, 2 
Utah 2d 329, 273 P. 2d 181, the court held that where a broker 
obtained a lease of real estate, the contract does not fall within 
the statute of frauds, and in so holding said: "It certainly 
must be conceded that the first blush impression is that mere 
rental of property should not be considered as a 'purchase 
or sale of real estate' ". And so here the first blush impression 
is that a contract employing a broker merely to obtain offers 
to sell land is not employment for the purchase or sale of real 
estate. 
This point is stated separately from point 3, for the reason 
that the evidence in the case indicates that appellant was not 
actually employed to obtain options on land, because he had 
no money with which to pay for an option, and that all that 
he actually did was obtain offers from the owners of land to 
17 
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sell to the respondent. Exhibit 2, which was supplied by the 
respondent, is a form of option which requires $25.00 per 
acre to obtain the option. Since the tracts involved and con-
sidered by the respondent were from 500 to 1000 acres (Tr. 
14), it would have taken from $12,500.00 to $25,000.00 to 
enable appellant to proceed in the respondent's behalf. The 
appellant testified that he never, at any time, had any money 
whatever with which to tie up any land (Tr. 25, 33, 48 and 84). 
It is, therefore, plain that the appellant was not employed 
to obtain options on land, but to determine whether land could 
be purchased, either on an option basis or on an outright pur-
chase basis, such as Exhibit 7 constituted. 
It is true that the appellant obtained agreements in writing 
from the owners of lands, that in the event of sale they would 
pay a real estate commission to the appellant (Tr. 85) but 
that is not the agreement in action here. Respondent agreed to 
pay appellant for his services in working on these various 
properties, and at no time either empowered, enabled, or 
authorized the appellant to purchase a single acre for the 
respondent. 
This point also has significance in that it was suggested 
by the trial judge that employment which looks to, or aids, 
or assists in the purchasing or sale of real estate, comes within 
the spirit of the statute of frauds because of the case of 
Andersen vs. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d 725. This 
case will be considered more fully under point 3, and is 
equally applicable to point 2. 
In Johnson vs. Allen, supra, at page 139 of 158 P. 2d, 
the court considered the terms of a contract employing a broker 
18 
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to sell real estate which must be contained in the written memo-
randum. The court said: 
"The terms of the employment, the amount of com-
pensation, and the length of time the listing was to 
run, were all certain. It is not disputed that the lands 
sold were the lands listed in the contract. * * * The 
contract was not void under the statute of frauds. 
* * * And though it employed plaintiff to procure 
a purchaser for lands located in Idaho, the sale did 
for that reason not have to be consummated in Idaho. 
Under its terms plaintiff was authorized to sell the 
land to anyone who was willing to pay the agreed 
purchase price. Under its terms the contract could have 
been performed anywhere." 
The failure to give the appellant any authority, is addi-
tional evidence that the appellant was not employed to sell 
real estate, but only to obtain offers to be submitted to the 
respondent. 
In Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 77 Utah 176, 292 P. 915, 
918, the plaintiff, a real estate broker, was awarded a judgment 
for real estate broker's commission, which was reversed on 
appeal because there was ~o allegation or proof of an express 
contract of employment. This court held: 
"If it had been alleged that the appellants had em-
ployed respondent to procure from the Campbells a 
binding agreement for the exchange of their respec-
tive properties, it might well follow that the broker 
had earned his commission when he had procured such 
a contract, even though the properties, for some reason, 
are not actually exchanged. Jennings vs. Jordan, 31 
Cal. App. 335, 160 Pac. 576. But that is not this case. 
Here there is no allegation of any express contract of 
employment, either to sell or exchange, or to bring about 
19 
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the execution of a binding agreement for exchange or 
properties. The present case is controlled by Case v. 
Ralph, supra, so we have no alternative but to reverse 
the judgment. * * * '' 
Thus it appears that specific employment either to pur-
chase or sell or to bind the principal, is a necessary part of the 
employment of a broker in order to comply with the statute· 
of frauds. Conversely, if the employment does not authorize 
the purchase or sale and does not authorize the agent to bind 
the principal, there is no employment for the purchase or 
sale of real estate and the statute of frauds is not applicable 
at all. 
Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640, 643, was also 
an action by a broker to recover a commission in which he 
relied upon a written agreement and the case was reversed 
because the written agreement was not sufficiently specific. 
At page 642 the court stated: 
"The courts generally hold, that under such a statute 
a real estate broker or agent cannot recover commission 
for services rendered in either selling or procuring a 
purchaser for real property, unless it appeals: 1. That 
there is an express contract or agreement of authority 
in which the terms and conditions of his employment, 
if any, and the amount of his commission, etc., are 
stated; 2. That such contract be in writing; * * * ." 
And at page 643: "It is very clear, therefore, that 
up to this point no express contract authorizing the 
defendant to sell or to procure a purchaser is alleged 
in the complaint. While it is true that an express agree-
ment to pay commission is alleged, yet that is clearly 
insufficient to constitute a cause of action in view of 
the provisions of our statute. What the statute requires 
is that the employment of authority of the agent to 
20 
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sell or procure a purchaser, must be evidenced by an 
express agreement in writing. * * * All those state-
ments may be true, precisely as by the demurrer they 
must be conceded to be, and yet there is not an intima-
tion, even that what is alleged was done by virtue of 
an express contract, authorizing plaintiff to procure a 
purchaser.'' 
Again we point out that appellant was not authorized to 
purchase any land for the respondent, he was given no authority 
to bind the responent in any particular, he was given no money 
with which to make a down payment, and he was authorized, 
only, to solicit owners of land to determine their willingness 
to sell, and if possible, to get written offers to be submitted 
to the respondent, either in Salt Lake City or in Sacramento, 
California. It is not the failure to get the agreement in writing 
that is important, but the fact that there was no express agree-
ment of authority, and no means whereby the appellant was 
empowered to act for the respondent, as his broker or agent, 
in making a purchase. This just was not employment for the 
purchase or sale of real estate. If a sale had been made, the 
appellant would have looked elsewhere for his commission, 
but his action here is against the respondent for that which 
alone he was empowered to do, namely, attempt to package 
c; parcel of property so that it could be submitted to the re-
spondent for his investigation and approval. 
In Pacific South West Development Corp. vs. Western 
Pacific Railroad Co. (Cal. 1956), 301 P. 2d 825, 829 to 830, 
where the court held that employment of a broker to obtain an 
option is within the statute of frauds, the court inquired also 
into the sufficiency of the contract which will support an action 
for commission. The court said: 
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''The chief element required to be shown in writing, 
is the fact of employment of the broker to act for the 
principal in the transaction. * * * The above letter 
merely states the terms and conditions on which de-
~endant was willing to negotiate for the property, but 
1t does not show employment of plaintiff to act for 
defendant. * * * Furthermore, the last sentence of the 
letter indicates that various details yet remained for 
consideration in completing any transaction. * * * But 
such writing by Nelson and subsequent meetings with 
Stratton in attempting to work out a suitable arrange-
ment for purchase of the Lenfest property cannot satisfy 
the statutory requirement of a writing, 'subscribed by 
the party to be charged, or his agent.' " 
And, likewise, in O'Neil vs. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62 
P. 2d 672 and 674, where the court held that an agreement 
employing a broker to obtain an option is not employment 
to buy or sell an interest in land, the court went on to consider 
the essential terms of such an employment contract. The court 
stated: 
"The contract which was entered into by the defend-
ant, was an agreement to sell and purchase real estate, 
but such an agreement does not amount to a sale of 
real estate. It is an executory agreement which would 
become a sale of real estate when fully performed, that 
is, when all of the payments have been made. Wright 
Land & Investment Co. vs. Even, 57 Montana 1, 186 
Pac. 681. That particular contract had to be in writing, 
in order to be valid (subdiv. 5, sec. 7519); and if 
plaintiff had purported to sign such an agreement on 
behalf of the defendant, her authority by the terms 
of the sectoin was required to be in writing; but the 
defendant did not act in the execution of this agree-
ment through his representative, but did execute it in 
person. * * * The contract sued on was not required 
to be in writing by the statute pleaded." 
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3. Employment to obtain options to buy land is not within 
the statute of frauds. 
There is no evidence whatever in this case that the appel-
lant was employed to make an outright purchase of land in 
behalf of the respondent. There was conversation between the 
parties as to the obtaining of options and the documents which 
were used (Exhibits 2 and 7) both were denominated options. 
Even if this court should hold that the appellant was employed 
by the respondent to obtain options to buy land, the judgment 
of the district court should be reversed. 
In O'Neill vs. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62 P. 2d 672, the 
plaintiff brought action to recover compensation for services 
rendered by her in inducing one or more of certain persons to 
enter into a contract to purchase mining property from the 
defendant. Action was on express contract and also quantum 
meruit. Recovery was had on an express contract. The agree-
ment was that the plaintiff was to secure with certain persons 
either a lease and option or a lease or option that was accept-
able to the defendant with certain terms being specified, and 
the evidence established that an agreement was entered into 
by the defendant and one or more of such persons, on the terms 
specified. The Montana Supreme Court held: 
"The question is thus presented: Is a contract em-
ploying a broker or agent to induce others to enter 
into an option or lease, or a lease and option, required 
by the statute to be in writing? 
"It will be noted that the statute relates to the pur-
chase or sale of real estate. It was definitely decided by 
this court in the case of Kramer vs. Schmidt, 62 Mont. 
568, 206 Pac. 620, that a contract to secure an option 
23 
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need not be in writing. Since the holder of an option 
acquires nothing but a personal privilege to purchase, 
which does not ripen into an interest in the land until 
he ~hooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the 
optlon, and complies with the terms on which he pur-
chased it, an agreement employing a broker to procure 
or negotiate an option does not amount to an employ-
ment of a broker or agent to buy or sell an interest 
in land." 
The court then considered whether a lease was an interest 
in real estate and concluded that it was not and held: 
"The contract sued on was not required to be in writ-
ing by the statute pleaded." 
The question as to an option was squarely raised in 
Kramer vs. Schmidt, 62 Mont. 568, 206 P. 620. In that case 
one Bain had executed and delivered to one Awberry an option 
contract for sale of land at a specified price. 'Knowing of this, 
the defendant orally agreed with the plaintiff that if the plaintiff 
would procure the assignment of the option contract to the 
defendant, so as to give the defendant the right to purchase 
the land under the option, he would pay the plaintiff a com-
mission of one dollar per acre, or 5% of the entire purchase 
price. The plaintiff induced Awberry to assign the option to 
defendant and the defendant subsequently purchased the land, 
but refused to pay the commission of $3,600.00. The defendant 
raised the defense of the statute of frauds, which requires 
that a contract employing a broker to purchase or sell real 
estate must be in writing. The court squarely held that an 
option to buy real estate is to be distinguished from the pur-
chase or sale of real estate and that the statute of frauds is 
not applicable. It thus reasoned its decision: 
24 
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"Counsel insists that, since it appears from the evi-
dence that the agreement by which plaintiff was em-
ployed by defendant was not embodied in a writing 
signed by the latter, it came within the provision of 
the statute of frauds and was invalid. This contention 
proceeds upon the assumption that the plaintiff was 
employed as a broker or agent to purchase real estate 
on a commission. The evidence does not justify this 
assumption. It discloses that the contract gave to Aw-
berry a mere option to purchase the land within a 
specified time. Counsel falls into error in failing to dis-
tinguish between a contract of purchase and sale, and 
one granting a mere option to buy. In the early case 
of Ide vs. Leiser, 10 Montana 5, 24 Pac. 695, 24 Ameri-
can State Reporter 17, Mr. Justice DeWitt defined an 
option as follows:' * * * An Option * * * is neither 
a sale, nor an agreement to sell. It is simpy a contract 
by which the owner of property (real estate being 
the species we are now discussing) agrees with another 
person that he shall have the right to buy his property 
at a fixed price, within a time certain. He does not 
sell his land, he does not then agree to sell it; but he 
does then sell something, viz., the right or privilege 
to buy at the election or option of the other party. 
The second party gets in praesenti, not land, or an 
agreement that he shall have land, but he does get 
something of value, i.e., the right to call for and receive 
land, if he elects. The owner parts with his right to 
sell his land (except to the second party) for a limited 
period. The second party receives this right, or rather, 
from his point of view, he receives the right to elect 
to buy." (p. 621). 
Pacific Southwest Development Corp. vs. Western Pacific 
Railroad Co., 301 P. 2d 825, was an action upon an alleged 
contract for payment of a commission and is against appellant. 
The court found that the agreement was not established by the 
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evidence and could have rested its decision on that ground; but 
it went further and determined that even if the plaintiff had 
established its agreement, it could not have prevailed because 
the agreement to obtain the option was not in writing. Ne-
gotiations by the plaintiff at $2500.00 per acre broke down 
and the defendant then obtained directly from the owner an 
option to purchase the land at $2,750.00 per acre and this 
option was subsequently reduced to writing and then exercised 
by the defendant. A controversy arose as to whether the plaintiff 
was entitled to a half commission or a full commission and 
plaintiff brought the action for the full 5% commission. 
The court observed that: "In California an option to pur-
chase real property has been held to come within the statute 
of frauds and so must be in writing." 
The court then finds that the term real estate as used in 
the California Statute is the common law definition of real 
property and excludes estates for years. 
The court at page 829 then states that California decisions 
have already held that the phrase "to sell or purchase" includes 
"to aid or assist in the purchase or sale" of real estate, and "to 
hold otherwise would open the door to the assertion of un-
founded claims by brokers and others on the pretense of oral 
employment in real estate transactions, relative to options, and 
so frustrate the purpose of the statute." 
Thus there are four basic premises for the decision of the 
California Court: 
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B. Real estate ?: real property refers to a free hold interest 
in land and includes options. 
C. Aiding or assisting in the purchase or sale of real estate 
,. 
is included within the statute of frauds' phrase "to sell or pur-
chase." 
D. It is important to avoid fraudulent claims. 
Given these premises, and given also the fact that in this 
case the plaintiff sued only for its full commission, and did not 
allege any contract or services spent in bringing the parties 
together or in furthering the interests of the would-be buyer, 
the conclusion of the California court would not be persuasive 
in Utah without examining those premises. 
Let us consider, separately, the four premises which were 
held established in California and which led to the conclusion 
that employment to obtain an option is within the statute of 
frauds. 
a.An option to purchase real property must be in writing 
in California. We have previously cited the Montana cases 
which hold clearly that an option is not an interest in land and 
that the employment of a real estate broker to purchase or sell 
an option is not within the statute of frauds. 
says: 
The Pacific South West Development Corporation case 
"In California, an option to purchase real property 
has been held to come within the statute of frauds, 
and so must be in writing. Bovo vs. Abrahamson, 100 
Cal. App. 3 73, 383, 280 Pac. 191. The property of 
this holding was recognized in Wilson vs. Bailey, 8 
Cal. 2d 416, 65 Pac. 2d 770, 772, where the enforcement 
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of an oral extension of a written option to repurchase 
certain real property was in question." 
It should be noted that this was a four to three decision 
and that the disseating justices adopted the opinion of Mr. 
Justice Fourt in the District Court of Appeals in this case, 
reported at 293 P. 2d 800, including the holding of the lower 
court that an option is personal and not real property. 
Bovo vs· Abrahamson, supra, was a decision of the District 
Court of Appeal. It involved an action to compel a purchase 
of property in accordance with provisions of a trust deed ex-
ecuted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that defendant 
was trustee for the plaintiff and plaintiff had the right to re-
deem the property. The court found that the only agreement 
was that plaintiff could repurchase the property within a period 
of 18 months from the date, and that this agreement was with-
out consideration and had long since expired before the com-
mencement of the action. The court held: 
"That the agreement to convey was without con-
sideration, was oral, and constituted a mere option to 
purchase, and that the cause of action, if any ever 
existed, was barred by subdivisions one and five, sec-
tions 16 and 24, of the Civil Code, and by subdivisions 
1 and 5 of Section 1973 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, and by Sections 318, 320, 323 and 363 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, and was also barred by 
laches." (p. 193). 
It, therefore, appears that the holding that an option must 
be in writing was not necessary to the disposition of this case, 
although it was one of the grounds upon which the decision 
was placed. Subdivision 1 of these sections provides that an 
agreement that by its term is not to be performed within a 
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year from the making thereof, must be in writing. And section 
318, 320, 323 and 363 are limitation of action sections relating 
to real property and possession thereof. 
Wilson vs. Bailey, supra, is not a holding that an option to 
purchase the real estate must be in writing. In that case there 
was an option in writing an an oral extension was given under 
such circumstances as to constitute an equitable estoppel against 
claiming that the option was void. The court assumed that 
the extension would otherwise have had to be in writing and 
the court also held at 77 4 that the plaintiff had a clear right 
to redeem the property as a deed given merely as security, in 
which event there would have been no problem in the fore-
closure. 
Thus, neither of the cases relied on was persuasive. 
The District Court of Appeals decision in the Pacific South 
West Development case ( 29 3 P. 2d 800, 801), which was 
adopted by the three dissenting Justices, was as follows: 
··An option to purchase real property is a contract 
containing an irrevocable and continuing offer to sell 
at a specified price and a specified time. It conveys no 
interest in land to the optionee, but vests in him only 
a right in personam to buy at his election. Hence, an 
option contract relating to the sale of land is not a 
sale of porperty, but of a right to purchase. Hicks vs. 
Christeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716, 164 P. 395; Warner 
Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2nd 766, 772, 192 
P. 2d 949, 3 A.L.R. 2d 691; Seeburg v. El Royale 
Corp., 54 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4, 128 P. 2d 362; Kritt v. 
Athens Hills Development Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 
642, 646, 241 P. 2d 606. It follows that an option 
contract not being a contract for the purchase or sale 
of real estate, a contract employing a broker to obtain 
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the option does not fall within the provisions of Sec-
tion 1624, subdivision 5, of the Civil Code, or Section 
1973, subdivision 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 
Hicks vs· Christeson, supra, was an action for a commission 
brought by a real estate broker against the owner of land on 
the theory that the plaintiff had found a purchaser ready, able, 
and willing to buy. The plaintiff had, in fact, obtained a written 
option for the sale of the land from the defendant, and the 
question was whether he had found a buyer for the land under 
the option. The case stands for the proposition that a contract 
for the sale and purchase of property must be in writing and 
the plaintiff failed because he could not show the written 
agreement of the would-be purchaser to take up the option. But 
the court does say in that decision: 
"The agreement, which is the fountain head of any 
authority possessed by plaintiff, gave him the right 
to contract for sale. An option is by no means a sale 
of property, but is the sale of a right to purchase ( quot-
ing other California cases.) " 
In Warner Brothers Pictures vs. Brodel, supra, the court 
held that the giving of an option for personal services con-
stituted, in effect, a contract to perform or render services, 
as an actor or actress. The court reasoned that the option con-
stituted a continuing and irrevocable offer which could be 
accepted by the optionee within its terms and thereby bind the 
optionor, and that, therefore, provision of the statute against 
disaffirmance was satisfied as being a "contract to perform or 
render services·'. The court quoted the above language from 
Hicks vs. Christeson and said: 
"An option contract relating to the sale of land is, 
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therefore, 'by no means a sale of property, but is a sale 
of a right to purchase.' " 
and quoted approvingly from Shaugnessy vs. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 
141, 23 N.W. 2d, 362, 363, 166 ALR 435: 
" * * * A contract conferring an option to purchase 
is * * * an irrevocable and continuing offer to sell, and 
conveys no interest in land to the optionee, but vests 
in him only a right in personam to buy at his election." 
Seeburg vs. El Royale Corp., supra, was an action by 
plaintiff to recover $5,000.00 paid for an option to purchase 
an apartment house on the theory that the option had been 
rescinded and made nugatory· The court again stated that an 
option is not a sale of property but only of a right to purchase 
and that it is a right acquired by contract to accept or reject 
:· present offer within its terms. 
"On acceptance the option becomes the contract of 
sale, binding on both parties. * * * This does not mean, 
however, that a new contract is in fact made by and 
at the time of the acceptance. The contract has already 
been made, as far as the optioner is concerned, but 
it is subject to conditions which are removed by the 
acceptance.'' 
The case does not purport to decide whether an option 
falls within any provisions of the statute of frauds. 
Kritt vs. Athens Hill Development Co., supra, is a square 
decision that the obtaining of an option was not the making of 
a sale within the meaning of the contract by brokers to obtain 
<J commission on the sale of lots. The case does not involve 
the statute of frauds, but only the question of when a broker 
is entitled to his commission under a contract for payment of 
commission upon sale of a lot. The option contract took a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
deposit and provided for forfeiture of all but $50.00 in the 
event the option was not taken up. 
It, therefore, appears that the law in California on options 
under the statute of frauds was quite uncertain prior to the 
Pacific South West decision and that that decision being four 
to three invites careful scrutiny of the matters involved, in-
cluding the California precedents, before acceptance by this 
court. 
b. Real estate or real property refers to a freehold interest 
in land and (presumably) includes options. 
The California court cited two earlier cases: Dabney v. 
Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 6-7, 53 P. 2d 962, 103 ALR 822, and 
Marks V· Walter G. McCarty Corp., 33 Cal. 2d 814, 819, 205 
P. 2d 1025. Dabney v. Edwards simply holds that sale of oil 
and gas leases is not the sale of real estate and a contract em-
ploying a broker to sell them need not be in writing, and 
Marks v. Waletr G. McCarty Corp. holds that employing a 
broker to purchase or sell real estate is within the statute of 
frauds. The court cites no holding that an option is an interest 
in land, and the court itself does not so state. 
The California law appears to be contrary and to be that 
an option is not an interest in land, and the Pacific South West 
Development case must be rested on the ground that taking 
an option is aiding or assisting in the sale. 
In Warner Brothers Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 
772, 192 P. 2d 949, 3 ALR 2d 691, 696, the court says an 
option is not an interest in land. 
The question whether an option falls within subdivision 
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5 of the statute of frauds (UCA 1953 25-5-4) seems pretty 
well settled by the case of Woolley vs. Wycoff, 2 Utah 2d 329, 
273 p. 2d 181. In that case a real estate broker was employed, 
orally, to procure a tenant on a ten year lease for a certain 
warehouse. The plaintiff procured the tenant and Wycoff then 
failed to complete his purchase of the property and therefore, 
of necessity, was unable to enter into the lease. The plaintiff's 
action was for a commission of the negotiated lease. The court 
said: 
"It certanly must be conceded that the first blush 
impression is that mere rental of property should not 
be considered as a 'purchase or sale of real estate'. This 
is in accord with the common law principle that a 
lease was personal property, and under modern statutes 
it is generally held that the term 'real estate' does not 
cover leases or rental agreements." (p. 182). 
The defendant there urged that section 68-3-12 UCA 1853 
dealing with construction of statutes, uses a different phrase 
as to real estate and that this should be the measure of inter-
pretation of the term "real estate" in the statute of frauds. 
Subsection 10 of the section is: 
"The terms 'land', 'real estate' and 'real property', 
include land, tenements, hereditaments, water rights, 
possessory rights and claims." 
The court then considered at considerable length how the 
statute of frauds language should be interpreted and rejected 
the suggestion of this statutory aid and the possibility that the 
lease was a possessory right and then concluded with this 
language: 
"However, even if we should concur with the de-
fendant in making the doubtful assumption that a rental 
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agreement is "real estate" on the ground that it is a 
"possessory right", we are still met with the clear lan-
gu~ge of section 25-5-4(5} upon which the defendant 
rehes. It declares void only agreements to ' * * * Pur-
chase or sell real estate * * * '. A sale is certainly 
something fundamentally very different from rental 
o.f real property. The defendant did not employ plain-
tiff to procure a purchaser, but a lessee. Therefore,. the 
transaction did not involve a contract authorizing 
plaintiff to 'purchase or sell'. 
"Although it may be that there is a good reason why 
the legislature should have included agreements for 
rental of property in the statute requiring such agree-
ments to be in writing, as there is for sale, they did 
not do so. They announced the policy; we interpret it. 
For us to so interpret the statute that the words 'pur-
chase or sell' are equivalent to 'rental', is inconsistent 
with the manifest intent * * * ' expressed by the statute 
and would amount to extending its coverage by judicial 
legislation.'' 
And the court held that the contract employing a broker to 
procure a leassee for real property was not within the statute 
of frauds. 
It thus appears that this court would use the definition of 
section 68-3-12, if it were consistent with the language of the 
statute of frauds. Nothing in the definition of real estate sug-
gests that an option should be considered real estate, and it 
would seem to follow, almost a fortiori, that an option is not 
real estate within our statute of frauds. 
c. Aiding or assisting in the purchase or sale of real estate, 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The California case of Pacific South West Development 
Corp. cites two California decisions in support of this holding. 
These were Hooper v. Mayfield, 251 P. 2d 330, and Duckworth 
vs. Schumacher, 27 p. 2d 919. 
In Hooper v. Mayfield action was brought by a broker 
to recover full commission on a sale of real estate. He had 
conversations with the owners of the real estate and with a 
prospective purchaser, and there was some conversation with the 
purchaser about splitting a commission; but such purchaser 
later dealt directly with the defendant and completed the pur-
chase. The plaintiff attempted to show that he was employed 
as amiddle-man and not as a broker and, hence, was not under 
the statute of frauds. The court held that there was no proof 
of employment as a middle-man and, therefore, rejected the 
distinction between a middle-man and the agent of either buyer 
or seller, on the facts of the case. The decision quoted from 
Duckworth vs. Schumacher without any indication that the 
cases were analogous. 
Duckworth vs. Schumacher holds that employment for the 
purpose of aiding or assisting in the sale of real estate is 
within the statute of frauds. In that case: 
"According to the complaint, the plaintiff was to 
assist and aid the defendant in laying out for subdi-
vision and subdividing for sale certain lands of the 
defendant and to act as defendant's general sales man-
ager in charge of the advertising of said subdivision, 
and devising ways and means of promoting the sale 
of said tract and superintending the sale thereof at 
a stated salary per week, until the employment should 
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From this the court concluded: "The employment had to 
do with the sale of real estate." And at page 921 the court 
said, in distinguishing earlier cases: 
"In the case at bar, the plain intendments of the 
parties to the contract were that the plaintiff was to aid 
and assist in preparing a certain tract of land belonging 
to the defendant for sale, by laying the same out for 
subdivision and subdividing it; to act as sales manager; 
to promote the sales by a plan of campaign of adver-
tising; and to superintend the sale thereof. * * * Such 
employment, therefore, had for its sole object and 
purpose the sale of the real property, and such an em-
ployment is within the inhibition of section 1624 of 
the Civil Code. To hold otherwise would give rise to 
a practice of ingenious forms, without substance in 
fact, and thus avoid the very salutary rule of law as 
declared in section 1624 of the Civil Code, and open 
the door to fraud, long closed by said statute, and would, 
in effect, abrogate such statute of frauds." 
These cases do not suggest at all that anything which is 
done by a real estate broker calculated to aid or assist in making 
a purchase or a sale comes within the statute of frauds. The 
cases hold and mean that a real estate broker cannot call him-
self something else, such as a middle-man or a sales manager, 
when, in fact, his duties are to act as agent for the sale or 
purchase of real estate, and still claim that he is not within 
the statute of frauds relating to purchase or sale of real estate. 
This is made plain by the case of Owen v. National Container 
Corp· of California, 251 P. 2d 765, decided after both of the 
cases relied on under this portion of the decision in Pacific 
Southwest Development Corp. and not disturbed or distin-
guished by the Pacific Southwest case. The Owen case was an 
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action for the usual five percent commission, based upon the 
cost of the building for services connected with finding the 
location and assisting in the planning of the building. The 
lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the 
ground that the contract alleged violated the statute of frauds. 
On appeal the court held that the complaint stated a cause 
of action for a valid oral agreement and that the proof would 
have to determine whether there was an agreement for special 
services or an agreement incident to the purchase of real estate. 
The allegations of the complaint were that plaintiff worked 
during a period of three years to assemble information for the 
defendant as to a suitable factory site, sending information 
concerning a number of properties which were eventually found 
unsuitable. Plaintiff also submitted information concerning the 
site actually purchased and concerning the plans, specifications, 
and estimates for a factory building to be erected on the site. 
At page 768 the court held: 
"A valid oral agreement could be made for the 
special services alleged, consisting of the surveys made, 
the furnishing of plans, specifications and estimates, 
and the negotiations carried on for the construction 
of a building by Central Manufacturing District." 
And at page 769, concluded: 
"We may say, however, in conclusion, that if the 
court should find that the services alleged were merely 
incidental to plaintiff's efforts to bring about a sale of 
real property to defendant, and that there was no 
express agreement of defendant to pay for the same, 
plaintiff cannot prevail in this action, either upon con-
tract or in quantum meruit." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Andersen vs. Johnson, supra, 160 P. 2d 725, was an action 
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against a real estate broker for a one-third commission for 
services rendered in obtaining listings and helping the de-
fendant make sales. The defendant stood on a general demurrer 
to the complaint, contending that the plaintiff was acting as 
a real estate salesman without a license and could not maintain 
the action, and also because the agreement for compensation 
was void as within the statute of frauds, requiring employ-
ment of a broker to be in writing. Most of the court's opinion 
is an analysis of the sections of the statute regulating the real 
estate brokers and salesmen, and defining as a broker one 
who buys or sells real estate for another or who "assists or 
directs in the procuring of prospects, or otherwise assists in 
transactions 'calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leasing 
or renting of any real estate.' " 
The court held that the work of the plaintiff in assisting 
in the sale of real estate did not constitute him a real estate 
broker, and as to the statute of frauds held: 
"The contention of respondent that plaintiff cannot 
recover because his agreement was oral, is untenable. 
The contract was one of enmployment and not involv-
ing any rights or interest in land. See Johnson vs. 
Allen, Utah 1945, 158 P. 2d 134." 
It thus appears from the California decisions as well as 
from the Utah case, that simply aiding or assisting in the pur-
chase or sale of real estate does not place the activities or 
the employment contract within the statute of frauds; the real 
test is whether there is a bona fide and valid agreement to 
do something other than purchase or sell real estate, for which 
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d. It is impot'tant to avoid fraudulent claims· 
The Pacific Southwest case cites no authorities to support 
this observation, but states: "To hold otherwise would open 
the door to the assertion of unfounded claims by brokers and 
others on the pretense of oral employment in real estate trans-
actions relative to options, and so frustrate the purpose of the 
statute." 
If plaintiff were here suing for a real estate commission 
on the theory that he had found lands suitable to defendant's 
directions, which defendant had capriciously refused to pur-
chase, the above language would be very apt. Defendant did 
not employ plaintiff to purchase real estate and the evidence 
of plaintiff was that, were sales to be consummated, the plaintiff 
would look to the owner for his compensation, and would 
claim nothing from the defendant. Defendant was a stranger 
to plaintiff and came here as a big time building contractor 
from California, who was interested in a very large develop-
ment in Salt Lake County at the time the rumors concerning 
the building of a Boeing plant here were rife. The defendant 
offered to pay plaintiff for his services if he would get busy 
and package up a parcel or several parcels for him. But he 
gave plaintiff no authority to buy or tie up any land, and no 
money upon which to operate or obtain options. Plaintiff simply 
took the defendant at his word and spent a large amount of 
time attempting to put attractive acreage together for the 
defendant, and in the hope of realizing a substantial commis-
sion from the sellers, in the event the sales should be con-
summated. 
The witness, Orin Woodbury, testified that the usual 
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practice is to work for such a prospect and obtain payment on 
a time basis if no deal is consummated, and that this is the 
rule of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board; but that he, personally, 
would not undertake such work for any prospect who made 
no option money available. 
Was the plaintiff too credulous, too trusting, too willing 
to accept a substantial business man at his word? Mr. Wood-
bury was of the opinion that unless option money is put up, 
there is no guarantee of good faith, and perhaps the plaintiff 
should not have worked for the defendant. But he did proceed 
to work diligently, made many reports by letter and by tele-
phone to the defendant, in an honest endeavor to satisfy the 
defendant and to package a parcel which would suit his re-
quirements. He now asks the court to require the defendant 
to live up to his promise to pay for plaintiff's services, and as 
the court observed, the plaintiff is a reliable broker and the 
compensation requested appears to be reasonable (Tr. 152). 
We have attempted to analyze the Pacific Southwest case 
and the authorities upon which it rests rather carefully, for 
the reason that the trial court relied primarily, if not solely, 
on that case· It is based, in part, upon law peculiar to California 
and was an effort to go beyond the required scope of the case, 
in order to settle conflicting and confusing decisions in the state. 
It found a lack of employment to purchase or sell real estate 
and did not need to go any further in reaching a decision. 
It was a suit for a commission on the sale of real estate, and 
was based on the theory of employment to obtain an option 
with authority so to do. In all of these respects it is dis-
tinguishable from the case at bar, is contrary to the indicated 
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Utah decisions on what is an interest in real estate, and whether 
an option is the purchase or sale of real estate and should 
not be followed by this court. Perhaps the Pacific Southwest 
case has been given more attention than it deserved. 
Many other authorities have considered the question of 
whether an option must be in writing to comply with the 
statute of frauds. Some of these decisions are controlled by 
the language of the statute and some have statutes similar 
to the Utah statute. 
Richanbach vs. Ruby, 127 Ore. 612, 271 P. 600, 61 ALR 
1441, p. 1447, is a square holding that an option to purchase 
land is not an interest in land and need not be in writing 
within the meaning of the statute of frauds. An annotation 
following the case at page 1454 states that only two cases 
raise the question square! y, one being the Richanbach case and 
the other being Granger Real Estate Exchange vs. Anderson 
(Texas Civil Appeals) 145 S. w. 262, which reached a con-
• trary holding. In the Texas case the real estate broker sued 
for his commission on the sale of land, alleging that he had 
found a buyer who was ready, able, and willing to buy. The 
case turned on whether or not the owner had given the plain-
tiff's prospect an oral option for two days within which to 
decide whether he would pay the interest rate. The court held 
that this option was void, both because it was without con-
sideration and because it was not in writing and fell under 
that provision of the statute of frauds requiring that a "con-
tract for the sale of real estate must be in writing.'' 
A Minnesota case, decided in 1946, lines up squarely be-
hind Richanbach vs. Ruby, supra. Shaughnessy, et al, vs. 
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Eidsmo, et al, 23 N. W. 2d 362, 365. The court there held 
that an oral agreement to lease premises with an option to 
buy was specifically enforceable, holding: 
"This option, prior to execution or acceptance, did 
not of itself contribute anything to bring the agreement 
under the statute of frauds. In the first place, the 
contract conferring an option to purchase, is nothing 
more than an irrevocable and continuing offer to sell, 
and conveys no interest in land to the optionee, but 
vests in him only a right in personam to buy at his 
election. At best it is but an irrevocable right or privi-
lege of purchase and does not come within Minnesota 
statute 1941, section 513.04." 
The court upheld an order, giving specific performance to 
the plaintiff of the option to purchase real estate at the ex-
piration of the lease. 
In McGuirk vs. Ward, (Vermont 1947), 55 Atl. 2d 610, 
the court considered whether an option to purchase land was 
within the Vermont statute of frauds, requiring to be in 
writing "a contract for the sale of lands or an interest in or 
concerning them.'' The court considered the cases for and 
against holding that an option is an interest in land, including 
the following citation from 55 Am. Jur. p. 492, Section 27: 
"An option to purchase real property may be defined 
as a contract by which an owner of real property agrees 
with another person that the latter shall have the privi-
lege of buying the property at a specified price within 
a specified time, or within a reasonable time in the 
future, and which imposes no obligation to purchase 
upon the person to whom it is given. Until the holder 
or owner of an option for the purchase of property 
exercises it, he has nothing but a mere right to acquire 
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an interest, and has neither the ownership of nor any 
interest in the property itself." 
The court also referred to the annotation at 61 ALR 1454 and 
found additional cases on both sides of that proposition, but 
distinguished one line of cases on the ground that the statutes 
involved were similar to the Vermont statute, requiring that 
a contract be in writing when it is for the sale of lands or 
for "an interest in or concerning them" and held that since 
the Vermont statute was like those others and since an option 
appeared to be a contract concerning lands, it would have to 
be in writing in Vermont. 
Williston on Contracts, Section 491, page 1416, finds the 
authorities to be divided on this question. The text says: 
"In regard to an oral option given by an owner of 
land, Montana and Oregon hold that an option creates 
no interest in land until it is accepted and a binding 
contract is formed, while a number of states hold an 
interest in land is immediately created and require the 
option to be in writing." 
It is interesting to note that the 1956 Cumulative Supple-
ment gives an instruction to change this sentence to read as 
follows: 
"In regard to an option given by an owner of land, 
some states hold that an option creates no interest in 
land until it is accepted and a binding contract is 
formed, while others hold an interest in land is im-
mediately created and requires an assignment of rights 
under the option to be in writing", citing one additional 
case for the last proposition. 
This seems to change the holding that an option is not an 
interest in land from a two state rule to the preferred view, 
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and at least indicates that in the opinion of the author that 
view became stronger between the time of the text and the 
time of the supplement. The one case cited, Harper vs. Pauley, 
West Virginia 1953, 81 S. E. 2d 728, is of no assistance. In 
that case there was a written option which was finally held 
to be insufficient as to the description of land and in a suit 
for specific performance it was held that the description was 
insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, but without any 
apparent consideration of whether the option created an interest 
in land. 
If an option is not an interest in land, it follows that 
employment to obtain an option is not employment to purchase 
real estate and need not be in writing under the statute of 
frauds. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The agreement between appellant and respondent was 
that respondent would pay for appellant's services in packaging 
or putting together some large tracts of land in Salt Lake 
County for respondent's consideration, but if any were pur· 
chased, appellant would look to the sellers for his compensa-
tion. This was not employment for the purchaser of real estate 
for compensation. Appellant had no authority to bind re-
spondent, had no money from respondent and was unable 
to obtain anything more than offers to sell for respondent's 
consideration. The word "option, was used but appellant was 
not empowered to obtain a valid option and obtained none. 
And if he had been employed to obtain a valid option that 
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would not be the obtaining of an interest in land in Utah 
and would not be employment for the purchase or sale of land 
for compensation. 
The order dismissing the complaint should be reversed 
and the district court should be directed to enter judgment 
for the appellant as prayed in the complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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